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The subject of removal jurisdiction and procedure has long
been one of the most difficult and confusing areas of federal prac-
tice.' Much of the confusion concerning removal results from the
fact that the removal statutes have been amended in piece-meal
fashion, and have not been integrated into one coherent scheme.
Therefore, the attempt to clarify federal removal jurisdiction and
procedure in the proposed revision of Title 28 of the United States
Code 2 is most commendable. The most striking improvement ef-
fected by H.R. 3214 is one of form and arrangement. The present
law contains one statutory provision conferring removal jurisdiction
generally3 and a number of scattered provisions conferring removal
jurisdiction in certain specific cases.4 The procedural and juris-
dictional provisions are intermingled. In H.R. 3214, the general
jurisdictional provision is followed immediately by the provisions
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ILEwIs, REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS 8-17
(1923); Andrews, Federal Removal Confusion, 9 Miss. L. J. 188 (1936);
Flory, Federal Removal Jurisdiction, 1 LA. L. REV. 499 and 737 (1939);
Comment, Chaos of Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts, 35 ILL. L. R.
566, 574 (1941).
2H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), hereinafter cited as H.R.
3214. This bill was passed by the House of Representatives July 7, 1947,
and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary July 8, 1947.
336 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §71 (1940).
4 E.g., 36 STAT. 1096 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §73 (1940); 36 STAT. 1096 (1911),
28 U.S.C. §74 (1940); 39 STAT. 532 (1916), 28 U.S.C. §76 (1940); 36 STAT.
1098 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §77 (1940).
5 §1441. It provides in part as follows, "Actions removable generally
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending. (b) Any
civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought."
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for specific cases.' The procedural provisions are separate.' The
logical symmetry of H.R. 3214 should of itself obviate many of the
difficulties encountered in interpreting the present amorphous
code.
REMOVAL JURISDICTION
The present provisions authorizing removal of cases in which
there has been a denial of civil rights," cases brought by aliens
against civil officers of the United States,9 and suits against revenue
officers,' 0 have been substantially retained in H.R. 3214, the last
mentioned provision being enlarged to include suits against all
officers and employees of the United States."
The present statute authorizing removal in suits between citi-
zens of the same state claiming land under grants from different
states' 2 is omitted as obsolete. However, the present provision con-
ferring original jurisdiction upon the district courts in such cases
is retained.13 The result would seem to be that such cases could
be removed by virtue of the general removal jurisdictional pro-
vision.
The present provision authorizing removal because of preju-
dice or local influence" is eliminated in H.R. 3214. This provision,
enacted shortly after the Civil War, has been construed so narrowly
that it is of little significance. For a case to be removable under
this section, the requirements as to jurisdictional amount and com-
plete diversity must be met.' 5 The only advantages of proceeding
under this section are: a single defendant may remove, 16 the peti-
tion may be filed any time before trial, and the petition is filed in
the district court rather than the state court.
The "Separable Controversy"
One change of substantial nature is the revision of the famous
"separable controversy" provision:
And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of
different states, and which can be fully determined as be-
tween them, then either one or more of the defendants
0 §§1442, 1443 and 1444.
7 §§1446-50.
836 STAT. 1096 (1911); 28 U.S.C. §74 (1940).
936 STAT. 1098 (1911); 28 U.S.C. §77 (1940).
1039 STAT. 532 (1916); 28 U.S.C. §76 (1940).
11H.R. 3214, §1442.
"236 STAT. 1096 (1911); 28 U.S.C. §73 (1940).
I3H.R. 3214, §1354.
1436 STAT. 1094 (1911); 28 U.S.C. §71 (1940).
"5 Cochran v. Montgomery, 199 U.S. 260 (1905); Roraback v. Pennsyl-
vania Co., 42 ' A- A9t0 (C.C.D. Conn. 1890); Terre Haute v. Evansville, etc.
R. Co., 106 Fed. 545 (C.C.D. Ind. 1901).
18 Cochran v. Montgomery, supra note 15, at 270.
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actually interested in such controversy may remove said
suit to the district court of the United States for the proper
district . . .17
This clause 18 resulted in the creation of a new procedural con-
cept, a "controversy," which is not defined by statute. It is nar-
rower in extent than "suit."'19 It is probably narrower than "cause
of action," although many courts, in defining the concept, treat it
as almost synonymous with "cause of action."20 If a separable con-
troversy exists within a suit, then the defendant or defendants
actually interested in such controversy may remove the entire suit
(not merely the controversy itself) to the federal court.21 Thus,
when a separable controversy is claimed to exist, the court is re-
quired to answer an essentially hypothetical question, namely,
whether a separate action could have been brought involving this
controversy alone. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the en-
tire suit, although not otherwise removable, becomes removable by
reason of the inclusion within it of the separable controversy.
The separable controversy clause permits removal in three situ-
ations in which removal would be impossible under the general
removal provision: 22
When some defendants refuse to join. If plaintiff of Ohio sues
defendants A and B, both of New York, in an Ohio state court, A
cannot remove alone; B must join in the petition. But if there is a
separable controversy between plaintiff and defendant A, A may
remove; it is not necessary that B join in the petition.
When some defendants are citizens of the state in which suit
is brought. Plaintiff of Indiana sues defendant A of New York and
defendant B of Ohio, in an Ohio state court. A and B cannot re-
move, because B is a resident of Ohio. But if there is a separable
controversy between plaintiff and defendant A, A may remove.
When a defendant is a citizen of the same state as a plaintiff.
Plaintiff of Indiana sues defendant A of New York and defendant B
of Indiana in an Ohio state court. A and B cannot remove, because
plaintiff and defendant B are both citizens of Indiana. But if there
1736 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §71 (1940), third sentence.
I8 The separable controversy clause first appeared in the Act' of 1866
(14 STAT. 306), was substantially amended in 1875 (18 STAT. 470), and has
been retained in substance ever since.
"0 This is necessarily so since the controversy is embodied within the
suit. Harrison v. Harrison, 5 F. 2d 1001 (N.D. Miss. 1922).
2 0 Tolbert v. Jackson, 99 F. 2d 513 (C.C.A. 5th 1938), rehearing denied,
100 F. 2d 909; Harrison v. Harrison, 5 F. 2d 1001 (N.D. Miss. 1922); Gudger
v. Western N.C.R.R., 21 Fed. 81 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1884).
21Under the 1866 Statute, apparently only the separable controversy
was removable. See Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1880), a leading
case which construed the 1875 amendment.
2236 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §71 (1940), second sentence.
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is a separable controversy between 'plaintiff and defendant A, A
may remove.
23
A common type of case which may involve a separable con-
troversy is the negligence action against a non-resident employer.
,Quite frequently a resident employee is joined as a defendant with
a non-resident employer. 24 A typical example is a suit against a
railroad company and its engineer. The railroad company will often
attempt to remove the suit to federal court. Whether or not the
company is successful in having the suit removed depends upon
state law. If, according to state law, a joint action may be main-
tained against the master and the servant when the master is liable
only on the basis of respondeat superior, such a suit is not remov-
able under the separable controversy clause. 25 If, on the other
hand, under state law, a joint action may not be maintained against
master and servant, a separable controversy exists, and the suit
may be removed..
2 6
Thus, in Ammond v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,27 the
resident engineer was joined as a defendant with the railroad, a
foreign corporation, in a suit commenced in the Common Pleas
Court of Stark County, Ohio. In upholding removal to the district
court, the circuit court of appeals pointed out that in Ohio a joint
action may not be maintained against a master and servant where
the master's liability is based solely upon the principle of respondeat
superior.28 Therefore, it held that a separable controversy existed,
authorizing removal.2 9
23The constitutional problem presented by the application of the
clause to this situation is discussed infra at p. 261.
24 In Ohio, the plaintiff's motive in joining the employee may be to
make it possible to cross-examine him as an adverse party under OHIO
GEN. CODE ANN. §11497 (1938), as well as to prevent removal.
25 The following cases support the view that there is but a single
cause of action; Putnam Memorial Hospital v. Allen, 34 F. 2d 927 (C.C.A.
2d 1929); Evans v. Sioux City Service Co., 206 F. 841 (N.D. Iowa 1913).
26 See note 27 infra.
27 125 F. 2d 747 (C.C.A. 6th 1942).
28Apparently plaintiff cannot prevent removal by the device of al-
leging simply that "defendants" committed the acts of negligence (thus
not disclosing on the face of the petition that the only basis for liability
of one defendant is respondeat superior). This form of pleading was up-
held against a motion to make definite and certain in Davis v. Montei, 38
Ohio L. Abs. 147, 49 N.E. 2d 584 (Ohio App. 1942). However, in defendant's
petition for removal, the true basis of the claimed liability may be alleged.
209 However, if the master's liability is not based solely upon respondeat
superior, but upon concurrent negligence, e.g. negligence in employing a
careless servant, the master and the servant may be joined. If concurrent
negligence is alleged, at least in good faith, a separable controversy does
Rot exist. American Bridge Co. v. Hunt, 130 Fed. 302 (C.C.A. 6th 1904);
Roberts v. Shelby Steel Tube Co., 131 Fed. 729 (C.C.A. 6th 1904). Cf. Wery
v. Seff, 136 Ohio St. 307, 29 N.E. 2d 361 (1940); Kaiser v. Rodenbaugh, 33
Ohio Op. 196, 68 N.E. 2d 239 (1946).
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In Ohio, the master-servant cases are probably the commonest
class of cases which may involve a separable controversy. In view
of the Ohio law relating to joinder of persons primarily and sec-
ondarily liable, there would seem to be a possibility of the existence
of a separable controversy whenever a plaintiff attempts to join
such persons as co-defendants.3 0 Other illustrations of cases which
have been held to involve separable controversies are: an action
against several insurance companies collectively insuring the same
property,31 a suit by a lessor against his lessee and non-resident as-
signee for cancellation of the lease and for damages;3 2 and action
against shareholders to recover separate assessments;33 and an ac-
tion against a contractor and his non-resident surety on the con-
tractor's bond.34
The Constitutional Question
An obvious constitutional problem was posed by the separable
controversy provision. Congress cannot extend the judicial power
of the federal courts beyond the limits of the Constitution. 5 It is
well established that diversity of citizenship means complete diver-
sity, i.e., diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants. 36 How-
ever, the separable controversy provision permits the removal of
suits which are not wholly between citizens of different states. For
example, to repeat a previous illustration,37 if plaintiff of Indiana
sues defendant A of New York and defendant B of Indiana in an
30The subject of primary and secondary liability is discussed com-
prehensively in Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E. 795 (1940).
31 Automobile Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 7 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. N.Y. 1934);
Des Moines Elevator & Grain Co. v. Underwriters Ass'n, 63 F. 2d 103
(C.C.A. 8th 1933); Kohler and Chase v. United American Lines, 46 F. 2d
178 (S.D. N.Y. 1930); Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. American Ins. Co.,
190 N.C. 801, 130 S.E. 864 (1925).
32 Brown v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., 26 F. 2d 100 (D.C. Kan. 1928).
Many suits involving lessors and lessees are not removable. Condemnation
proceedings and actions to change a crossing grade against both the lessor
and lessee were held to constitute but a single cause of action and so not
removable in Bellaire v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 146 US. 117 (1892), and
State ex. rel. Columbus v. Columbus & Xenia R.R., 48 Fed. 626 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1891).
33Wright v. Ankeny, 217 Fed. 985 (D. Wash. 1914).
34 Hilton v. Southern Ry., 21 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. S.C. 1937).
35 Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303 (U.S. 1809).
36 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U.S. 1806). It has been argued
that the Supreme Court has merely held that the statute requires complete
diversity-not that the Constitution requires it. Chafee, The Federal Inter-
pleader Act of 1936, 45 YALE L. J. 963, 973 (1936); Comment, The Separ-
able Controversy, a Federal Concept, 33 CORN L. Q. 261 (1947). However,
the Constitution (ART. HI, §2) and the statute (28 U.S.C. §41) contain
almost identical wording.
37See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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Ohio state court, A and B cannot remove under the second sentence
of Section 71 as both plaintiff and defendant B are citizens of In-
diana, and, therefore, the requisite diversity of citizenship does not
exist. However, if a separable controversy exists between plaintiff
and defendant A, A may remove the entire suit to the federal court.
It could be argued that this results in an enlargement of removal
jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Constitution.
However, it is probably correct to say that there has been tacit
approval of the constitutionality of the statute. The question has
been seldom mentioned. In construing the Removal Act of 1875,31
Justice Bradley, in a concurring opinion, called for a broad con-
struction of the Constitution and the statute, and asserted that the
federal courts could have jurisdiction over a controversy that is
not wholly between citizens of different states.19 A year later, when
the same statute was construed to permit removal of the entire suit
if a controversy between citizens of different states is included
therein, the constitutional question was ignored.4° Since then the
constitutional question has been examined by a district court4' and
a circuit court of appeals.4 2 The constitutionality of the statute was
upheld by both courts. The reasoning of the district court is in-
dicated by the following quotation:
While no decision of this constitutional question seems
to have occurred in the great landmarks on the subject ofjurisdiction for diversity of citizenship . . . the passing of
it in silence is itself significant .... By enforcing the stat-
ute, the courts have all been tacitly agreeing with the Con-
gress in its interpretation of the Constitution. The true
reasoning may be this: Article 3, Section 2, ordains that
the judicial power shall extend to controversies between
citizens -of different states. Article 1, Section 8, par. 18,
gives Congress power to make all laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers and all other powers vested by the Constitution in
the government of the United States, or in any department
or officer thereof. Congress, therefore, has authority to
make laws necessary and proper to extend the judicial
power effectively over such controversies, even when de-
veloped in state courts. Congress is the primary judge of
what is necessary and proper.43
The circuit court of appeals stated:
The Congress may give, restrict, or withhold such juris-
diction as it sees fit, within the boundaries fixed by the Con-
38 Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457 (1879).
39 Id. at 479.
40 Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1880).
1-1 Hoffman v. Lynch, 23 F. 2d 518 (N.D. Ga. 1928).
42Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F. 2d 227 (C.C.A. 5th
1945).
4 -Hoffman v. Lynch, supra, note 41, at 522.
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stitution, but it may not grant jurisdiction beyond those
boundaries unless as a necessary incident to an effectual
exercise of jurisdiction over the enumerated cases and con-
troversies ...
The jurisdiction of merelr local controversies that the
federal district courts exercise in cases of removal on the
ground of separable controversies is a different class of jur-
isdiction from that ordinarily defined by the Constitution
and statutes of the United States. It is of a class variously
called ancillary, auxiliary, dependent, incidental, or sup-
plementary. It is an extraordinary kind of ancillary juris-
diction in that it arises from an act of Congress expressly
conferring it."
There would seem to be a strong probability that if the ques-
tion were to come before the Supreme Court, it would uphold the
constitutionality of the clause.
The "Separate Controversy"
An important limitation on the operation of the separable con-
troversy clause has been formulated by the courts. This limitation
is known as the "separate controversy" principle. A well-known
case illustrating the "separate controversy" is Tillman v. Russo
Asiatic Bank.45 Plaintiff, an American citizen, brought an action
in a state court against the defendant bank, an alien corporation,
located in the city of Petrograd, Russia. He joined two causes of
action: one for dishonoring plaintiff's check drawn on his account
in defendant bank, and another for defendant's refusal to pay its
own draft drawn to one Fajans and endorsed to the plaintiff. The
circuit court of appeals held that the district court would not have
had jurisdiction of the second cause of action, standing alone, be-
cause of the "assignee clause,"' 6 and that jurisdiction could not be
based on the existence of a separable controversy (the first cause
of action being the claimed separable controversy), because the
removing defendant was an alien.47 The court could have stopped
there, but, instead, chose to set forth an additional ground for the
decision:
But in addition to this fatal objection, the controversy
here was not "separable." On the contrary, there were
joined in the complaint two entirely disconnected causes of
action having neither a common subject-matter nor any
other relation except that the plaintiffs and defendants
were the same and the causes of action were, and under
the practice might be, united in the same declaration.
While the causes of action were in every sense "separate,"
- Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Felt, supra, note 42, at 230.
4551 F. 2d 1023 (C.C.A. 2d 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539 (1932).
4636 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §41(1) (1940).
47The separable controvery provision applies only to "citizens of dif-
ferent states."-supra note 17.
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there was no "separable controversy" within the meaning
of the statute. A "separable controversy" does not arise
from a joinder of numerous unrelated causes of action in
order to eliminate many trials.... In such a situation the
entire suit should not have been removed to the United
States court, as is done where a "separable controversy"
exists, . . . but only the cause of action over which juris-
diction by reason of diversity of citizenship might be exer-
cised .... This is because the Removal Act allows removal
only of suits of which the District Courts are given original
jurisdiction.
The second cause of action is in every fundamental
sense a separate suit, and should be remanded to the State
Court.48
It will be noted that the court held the two causes of action
were "separate" because they were "entirely disconnected" and
"unrelated," not simply because they were two different causes of
action. The court's assertion that "the Removal Act allows removal
only of suits of which the District Courts are given original juris-
diction" is an unsatisfactory reason for the decision because, as
pointed out supra,4 9 the separable controversy clause does permit
the removal of suits in which complete diversity does not exist. The
district courts would not have original jurisdiction of such suits.
There are thus three gradations of cases: (1) suits involving
neither a separable nor a separate controversy, requiring complete
diversity for removal;50 (2) suits involving a separable controversy,
removable because the parties to the separable controversy have the
requisite diversity; 51 (3) suits involving a separate controversy, in
which only the separate controversy may be removed.52 A well-
known case thus summarized the possibilities:
If the complaint contained only one controversy, no
part of the suit was removable; if there were three separate
suits in a single proceeding, the action should have been
divided, two removed to the federal court, and one left in
the state court; if there were three controversies in one
suit, as we think, the entire suit was removable .... "
48 Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, supra note 45, at 1027-1028.
49 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
50 The following cases are illustrative: East Coalinga Oil Fields Corp.
v. Pure Oil Co., 66 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Cal. 1946); Russell v. Champion Fibre
Co., 214 Fed. 963 (C.C.A. 4th 1914).
51 The following cases are illustrative: State v. Neustadt, 149 F. 2d 143
(C.C.A. 10th 1945); Lynch v. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 15 F.
2d 725 (E.D. N.Y. 1926).
52 The following cases are illustrative: Lucania Societa Italians Dic
Navigazione v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 15 F. 2d 569
(S.D. N.Y. 1923); Nebraska v. North West Engineering Co., 69 F. Supp. 347
(D. Neb. 1946).
53 Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Felt, supra note 42, at 232.
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The "Separate and Independent Claim or Cause of Action"
H.R. 3214 eliminates the "separable controversy" as such, but
retains suit divisibility as a basis for removal jurisdiction. Section
1441 (c) is as follows:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause
of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone,
is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of actions, the entire case may be re-
moved and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not
otherwise within its original jurisdiction.4
It will be noted that this section in one respect is broader than
the present separable controversy provision in that it is not based
solely on diversity of citizenship, but is co-extensive with remov-
ability 5 It will thus include, for example, suits involving a fed-
eral question, and suits between a citizen of the District of Colum-
bia and a citizen of a state.50
Another basic change is the substitution of "a separate and
independent claim or cause of action" for "controversy wholly be-
tween citizens of different states." It is questionable whether this
change is an improvement. Admittedly the "separable contro-
versy" concept is unsatisfactory. Although the term has the ap-
pearance of simplicity, it has proved difficult of application. There
is much conflict in the cases on this subject.
However, the content of a "cause of action" is by no means
fixed and settled. The "uncertainties of the phrase" have been rec-
ognized by the United State Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.'
Justice Cardozo:
.. The analogy is helpful, yet it will confuse, instead
of helping, if we do not insist at the beginning upon a defi-
nition of our terms or at least recognition of their shifting
meanings. A "cause of action" may mean one thing for one
purpose and something different for another. It may mean
one thing when the question is whether it is good upon
demurrer, and something different when there is a question
of the amendment of a pleading or of the application of
the principle of res judicata .... At times and in certain
contexts, it is identified with the infringement of a right
or the violation of a duty. At other times and in other
5H.R. 3214, §1441 (c).
55 Withreference to the present clause a prominent authority stated,
removal of the suit on the basis of a separable controversy is only
a specialized form of removal on the ground of diverse citizenship." DoBIE,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AMD PROCEDURE 371 (1928). This will not be true
of H.R. 3214.
56 The constitutionality of 54 STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U.S.C. §41 (c) (1940),
has not been passed upon by the Supreme Court. See Comment, Diversity
Jurisdiction for Citizens of the District of Columbia, 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 309
(1948).
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contexts, it is a concept of the law of remedies, the identity
of the cause being then dependent on that of the form of
action or the writ. Another aspect reveals it as something
separate from writs and remedies, the group of operative
facts out of which a grievance has developed. This court
has not committed itself to the view that the phrase is sus-
ceptible of any single definition that will be independent of
the context or of the relation to be governed. ... .5
Various definitions of the term have been proposed,58 and a
vigorous debate as to its meaning has been carried on in the legal
periodicals.- The confusion in the use of the phrase resulted in its
studious avoidance by the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.60 It would seem inconsistent to adopt in the Judicial
Code a phrase which was deliberately avoided in the Rules. Further-
more, in addition to determining the extent of a "cause of action,"
the courts would have to determine when a cause of action is
"separate and independent." A lengthy period of uncertainty will
almost inevitably result from the adoption of Section 1441 (c). It
would seem distinctly preferable to retain the separable controversy
phraseology for the present. We have a large number of cases con-
struing the clause. Although these cases cannot be harmonized,
they can at least be classified.61 From the case material in a given
area, it is frequently possible to make an accurate prediction as to
whether a given case is removable. To adopt Section 1441 (c)
would be to throw away this substantial body of case material.
In this connection it should be noted that the House Committee
Report62 asserted that this change "will somewhat decrease the
volume of Federal litigation." Whether or not the amount of fed-
eral litigation should be decreased is a question of legislative pol-
icy, but even if we assume that such a decrease is a desirable ob-
57 U. S. v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1932). See also
Vasu v. Kohlers, 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E. 2d 707 (1945).
58 A discussion of various definitions can be found in: CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 129-148 (2d ed. 1947); McNish, Joinder and Splitting of Causes
of Action in Nebraska, 26 NEB. L. BULL. 42, 43-45, (1946).
69 McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. OF CH. L. REv. 281
(1937); Actions and Causes of Actions, 34 YALE L. J. 614 (1925); Wheaton,
The Code Cause of Action, 22 CORN L. Q. 1 (1936); Clark, The Cause of
Action, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1934); Joinder and Splitting of Causes of
Action, 25 MICH. L. Rav. 393 (1927); The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE
L. J. 817 (1924); Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition" of the "Cause of Action",
82 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (1933); The Code Cause of Action, 30 COL. L. REV.
802 (1930); Harris, What is a Cause of Action?, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 459
(1928).
60 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 146 (2d ed. 1947).
61 See Comment, 36 COL. L. REv. 794 (1936) for a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the scope of the separable controversy provision and a classifica-
tion of the cases.
62H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 134 (1947).
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jective it is doubtful whether Section 1441 (c) is an acceptable
method of accomplishing it.
It seems probable that certain types of cases now removable
-would not be removable under Section 1441 (c). Thus, the negli-
.gence action against a servant and a non-resident master may be-
,come non-removable even in Ohio. 3 It seems quite possible that
the courts would hold the cause of action against the master is not
"separate and independent" from that against the servant, as the
liability of the master and the liability of the servant stem from
the same tortious act. It is thus probable that in this respect Sec-
tion 1441 (c) will reduce the amount of federal litigation.
In another respect, however, Section 1441 (c) may increase
the amount of federal litigation in that it will permit removal of
.suits containing entirely separate and independent causes of action,
which are now remanded under the separate controversy limita-
tion. It would thus seem that there would be no substantial net
,effect on the volume of federal litigation.6
The objections to the present separable controversy clause,
.and to Section 1441 (c) of H.R. 3214, can not be overcome by minor
changes in phraseology. There does not seem to be any ready-
-made procedural concept to substitute for "separable controversy"
.and "cause of action."
The remedy must go deeper than that. A policy decision must
first be made as to whether divisibility of suit should be retained
as a basis for removal jurisdiction. If the decision is in the nega-
tive, thenthe separable controversy provision should be repealed.
If, on the other hand, the decision is in the affirmative, the scope
-of such removal jurisdiction should be explicitly formulated in the
.statute. The draftsman of the statute should not be constrained to
the compass of a brief paragraph. The statute should contain as
many words as are necessary to enable the courts to determine the
-question of removability with a reasonable degree of certainty. An
,example of the problem which should be covered explicitly by
.statute, is the effect that should be given to state joinder rules.
'There is hopeless confusion on this point. It has been said that if
the state law permits joinder of defendants, this precludes the possi-
bility of a separable controversy as to one of the defendants. Thus,
in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Black asserted:
It was thus broadly held that there can be no other or
63 Ammond v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra note 27.
04During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947, out of the 58,107 civil
cases commenced in the federal district courts, only 2,721 were removed
.from state courts. REP. ADMINISTRATr OFFICE OF THE U. S. CouRTs 110-111
.(1947).
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separable controversy, if a plaintiff properly elects under
state practice to sue defendants jointly.65
A similar view was expressed by Circuit Judge Hutcheson:
It is not a theoretically separable, but an actual sep-
arate, and distinct controversy, as viewed by the courts of
the state where the cause is pending, which determines its
removability.6
On the other hand, Chief Justice Hughes stated:
If, as to the non-resident defendant seeking removal,
the controversy is separable within the purview of the
statute as construed, the fact that under the state practice
it may be joined in the same suit with another controversy
as against other defendants, does not preclude removal. 7
On principle, it would seem that the mere fact that defendants
may be joined under state law should be irrelevant to the federal
question of removability. Carried to its logical conclusion, the cri-
terion of joinability under state practice would destroy the sep-
arable controversy concept. The very essence of that concept is
that, although the presence of parties joinable under state practice
may prevent removal under the general provision, removal may
nevertheless be effected if a separable controversy exists.
Any statute designed to replace the separable controversy pro-
vision should be subjected to thorough discussion and criticism. It
would seem desirable to postpone its consideration until after the
enactment of H.R. 3214, which should be amended to retain the
separable controversy phraseology.
The discretionary feature of Section 1441 (c), authorizing the
district court either to retain or remand the otherwise nonremovable
matters, is an improvement over the present practice. With such
a provision a court will not feel compelled to remand a "separate"
controversy to the state court. It might even be preferable to make
it mandatory for the district court to retain the entire cause, and
thereby abolish completely the "separate controversy" limitation.
There would seem to be no serious constitutional objection to
either course. The courts which have insisted upon remanding
separate controversies have not done so because of any supposed
constitutional compulsion. If the "ancillary jurisdiction" of the fed-
eral courts extends to separable controversies, there would seem to
be no reason why it should fall short of separate controversies. The
ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts should be broad enough
to avoid splitting a lawsuit between a federal and a state court.68
65Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 544, (1939).
66Lake v. Texas News Co., 51 F. 2d 862, 863 (S.D. Tex. 1931)
67 Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, supra, note 65, at 538.
6s For a suggestion that it might be an undue extension of the an-
cillary jurisdiction, see Note, Proposed Revision of the "Separable Con-
troversy" Rule, 42 ILL. L. REv. 105 (1947).
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REMOVAL PROCEDURE
Under existing statutes there are unnecessary variations in the
procedure for removing different types of cases. Special procedures
have been established for the removal of cases on the ground of
prejudice or local influence,69 suits against revenue and other desig-




Most removals, however, are governed by 28 U.S.C. 72, frequently
referred to as the general removal procedural statute. Under this
section, the normal steps are:
1. The removing defendant gives written notice to the adverse
party;
2. The removing defendant files the petition for removal and
the bond in the state court, on or before answer day as fixed by
state law;
3. The state court enters an order accepting the bond and
granting the removal;
4. The removing defendant files a certified copy of the state
court record in the district court;
5. The removing defendant files his motion or answer in the
district court within the time allowed for answer by the- law of the
state, or within five days after filing the transcript of the record in
the district court, whichever period is longer, but in any event
within twenty days after filing the transcript.
7 2
The case then proceeds as if it had originally been commenced
in the district court unless the district court orders repleader.
7 3
Under H.R. 3214 there will be but one uniform procedure appli-
cable to all removals with an occasional departure in criminal
cases. It provides:
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any
civil action or criminal prosecution from a State court
shall file in the district court of the United States for the
district and division within which such action is pending
a verified petition containing a short and plain statement
of the facts which entitle him or them to removal together
with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon
him or them in such action.
(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or pro-
ceeding may be filed within twenty days after commence-
ment of the action or service of process, whichever is later.
6936 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §71 (1940).
7039 STAT. 532 (1916), 28 U.S.C. §76 (1940).
7136 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §77 (1940).
72 28 U.S.C. §72 is modified by Rule 81 (c) of the FEDERAL RULES or
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, as
amended, effective March 19, 1948.
73Under Rule 81(c), FEDERAL RULES OF CIVL PROCEDURE FOR THE Dis-
TRICT COURTS OF THE UNTED STATES, id.
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(c) The petition for removal of a criminal prosecution
may be filed at any time before trial.
(d) Each petition for removal of a civil action or pro-
ceeding, except a petition in behalf of the United States,
shall be accompanied by a bond with good and sufficient
surety conditioned that the defendant or defendants will
pay all costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the
removal proceedings should it be determined that the case
was not removable or was improperly removed.
(e) Upon the filing of such petition and bond the de-
fendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to
all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the petition with
the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal
and the State court shall proceed no further therein unless
the case is remanded.
(f) If the defendant or defendants are in actual cus-
tody on process issued by the State court, the district court
shall issue its writ of habeas corpus, and the marshal shall
thereupon take such defendant or defendants into his cus-
tody and deliver a copy of the writ to the clerk of such
State court.7 4
The normal steps -in the removal of a case under this section
would seem to be as follows: 75
1. The removing defendant files his petition and bond in the
district court, within twenty days after the commencement of the
action or service of process, whichever is later.
2. The removing defendant gives notice to all adverse parties
and files a copy of the petition with the clerk of the state court.
3. The defendant files his motion or answer in the federal
court.
6
It will be noted that in H.R. 3214, the time for filing the re-
moval petition is made uniform in all cases, and is not dependent,
as at present, upon state law.
Section 1446 (e) is ambiguous. The previous discussion 77 has
assumed that the filing of the petition, bond, and notice "shall effect
the removal" without any further action by the state court.7 8 A
Tt-.R. 3214, §1446.
75 The ambiguity of §1446 (e) is discussed infra, note 77 et seq. The
following enumeration of steps is based upon what appears to be the most
reasonable construction.
76The time for pleading in district court is fixed by Rule 81(c) of
the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE supra note 72. The rule assumes
the filing of a transcript of the state court record in the district court, in
accordance with the present statute. There is no definite provision in
H.R. 3214 for filing such a transcript and consequently there may be diffi-
culty in applying the rule if H.R. 3214 is enacted in its present form.
77 See note 75 supra.
78 This construction assumes that the antecedents of "which" are the
filing of the petition and bond, and giving notice.
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possible alternative construction is that the state court shall take
some affirmative action to "effect the removal." 79 If the first con-
struction is intended, the statement in the House Committee Report"0
that the right of removal will be determined in the district court "be-
fore the petition is granted" would seem inconsistent."' If, on the
other hand, the latter construction is intended, the action to be
taken by the state court should be clearly stated, so that there will
be no doubt as to how the transfer is to be accomplished.
Likewise, the procedure in district court should be spelled out.
Although the House Committee Report 82 states that the right of
removal will be determined in the district court "before the peti-
tion is granted," no specific provision is made in H.R. 3214 for a
hearing on the petition. Such a provision should be included. In
this connection, it would seem desirable for Congress to make use
of the case material on procedural problems 83 encountered under
the present special removal statutes which require the petition to
be filed in the district court.8 4 However, if H.R. 3214 is enacted in
its present form, this case material should be helpful in working
out the new procedure.
The provision in H.R. 3214 that the petition for removal be filed
in federal court, rather than in state court as at present, is of
primary importance, and will obviate many of the difficulties en-
countered under the present procedure. The present requirement
that the petition be filed in state court inevitably causes trouble.
The state court is limited to consideration of the facts as alleged
in the petition for removal, and even a correct decision by the state
court may be nullified by a remand order based on evidence ad-
duced in the federal court. The delay which may result from the
present practice is strikingly illustrated in a case which began in
the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio. The defendant
filed a petition to remove, which was denied by the common pleas
79This construction assumes that the antecedent of "which" is "State
court."
8o H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 137 (1947).
81 The statement might be justified on the theory that removal is
effected by the filing of the petition, etc., but if the district court later
denies the petition, the case would be remanded.
82 H. R. REP. No. 308, note 80 supra.
83 E.g., (1) When jurisdiction is deemed transferred, (2) the steps in
the removal procedure, (3) whether or not a motion to remand is proper
to retry jurisdictional facts which were determined on the hearing of the
removal petition. Illustrative cases may be found in 28 U.S.C.A. §71, notes
611 et seq.; 28 U.S.C.A. §76, notes 31 to 34.
8lUnder present law, the petition is ified in the district court in suits
removable because of prejudice or local influence, suits involving revenue
and other designated officers, and suits brought by aliens against civil
officers of the U. S.
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court. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the Ohio Su-
preme Court, which held that the petition to remove should have
been granted. 5 Pursuant to the mandate of the Ohio Supreme
Court, the common pleas court granted the petition to remove. How-
ever, the district court sustained a motion to remand, holding that
the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court was not res judicata. In
this position the district court was upheld by the Supreme Court
of the United States.86 The futile litigation of the removal question
in the Ohio courts would not have taken place if the removal peti-
tion could have been filed initially in the federal court.
This case shows what can happen under the present procedure
when the state court holds that a case is removable and the federal
court holds that it is not removable. What is perhaps a more seri-
ous and frequent problem results from a holding by the state court
that a case is not removable, the federal court holding that it is re-
movable. If the state court denies the petition to remove, the de-
fendant, instead of relying upon the denial of the petition as a
ground for error, as in Kniess v. Armour,87 may, notwithstanding
the state court action, file a certified transcript of the state court
record in the federal court and ask the federal court to assume juris-
diction. If the federal court holds that the case is removable, and
assumes jurisdiction, the state court will ordinarily acquiesce in
the ruling of the federal court, and will proceed no further. How-
ever, in a considerable number of cases, the state court has not ac-
quiesced in the federal court's ruling and has proceeded to exercise
jurisdiction.
If the state court takes this position, the defendant may seek an
injunction against the prosecution of the action in state court. How-
ever, the federal courts are sometimes reluctant to grant such an
injunction.88 If an injunction is not granted, the defendant may
defend on the merits in both courts, in which event his interest will
be fully protected regardless of the ultimate decision on the ques-
tion of removability. Obviously, however, such double litigation
may be expensive. On the other hand, the defendant may choose
to ignore the further proceedings in the state court. If the remov-
85 Kniess v. Armour, 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. 2d 734 (1938).
86 Armour v. Kloeb, 311 U.S. 199 (1940).
87 See note 85 supra.
8836 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §379 (1940) forbids injunctions by
federal courts against proceedings in state courts. However, it has been
said that the Removal Acts qualify this statute pro tanto. Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133 (1941). H.R. 3214, §2283, provides,
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."
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ability of the case is ultimately upheld by the federal courts, the
further proceedings in the state court will be coram non judice,
and void. But if the federal courts should ultimately decide against
removability, and remand the case to the state court, the defendant
may find himself saddled with a valid default judgment in the state
court.8 9 This result follows from the concept of jurisdiction which
has been employed in this area. According to this concept, when
the question of removability is finally and conclusively determined,
that determination is applied retroactively, and any proceedings in
that court which is ultimately determined not to have had jurisdic-
tion are nugatory.
Filing the petition for removal in federal court will no doubt
reduce the number of such conflicts between state and federal
courts. Inasmuch as the state court will not have passed initially
on the petition for removal, it will not have taken a position against
removability, and will therefore be more likely to acquiesce in the
order of the federal court granting removal. However, it will still
be possible, if H.R. 3214 is enacted as it now stands, for a state
court to proceed in an action after a federal court has granted a
petition to remove.9 0 If a state court should do so, the defendant
presumably would be in the same position as under the present
procedure-he would be compelled to defend the action in both
courts if he wished to protect his rights completely. It is probably
inadvisable to attempt to amend H.R. 3214 to cover this situation.
If H.R. 3214 becomes law, the number of such conflicts may become
negligible. If, however, such conflicts continue, consideration should
be given to the possibility of enacting corrective legislation. Such
legislation might be directed to the jurisdictional concept which,91
it is believed, is the root of the present difficulty.
This concept is based upon the orthodox theory that an order
or judgment entered by a court not having jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter is void, and subject even to collateral attack. While
the theory has the merit of simplicity, its onsequences are often
undesirable. An early exception to the rule was made in McCor-
mick v. Sullivant,92 the Supreme Court holding that when final
judgment has been rendered in an action in a federal court, the
judgment could not be attacked collaterally on the ground that
there was not in fact diversity of citizenship between the parties.
89 E.g., Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563 (1941);
Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. 2d 1053 (1939); Yankaus v. Felt-
enstein, 244 U.S. 127 (1917).
90Although H.R. 3214, § 1446 (e) states that "the state court shall
proceed no further," similar language in the present law [36 Stat. 1095
(1911), 28 U.S.C. J72 (1940)] has not prevented such conflicts.
91Supra, preceding paragraph.
9210 Wheat. 192 (U.S. 1825).
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Quite recently, the rule has been further qualified by the ap-
plication of the principle of res judicata to questions of jurisdiction
of the subject matter.9 3
Another inroad has been made on the orthodox theory from
a different direction. It has often been held that a temporary in-
junction or restraining order entered by a court without jurisdic-
tion is void, and a violation thereof is not punishable as a contempt.
However, in the celebrated case of United States v. United Mine
Workers of America,94 the Supreme Court stated an important
limitation on this rule:
In the case before us, the District Court had the
power to preserve existing conditions while it was deter-
mining its own authority to grant injunctive relief. The
defendants, in making their private determination of the
law, acted at their peril. Their disobedience is punishable
as criminal contempt....
.. We insist upon the same duty of obedience where,
as here, the subject matter of the suit, as well as the parties,
was properly before the court; where the elements of fed-
eral jurisdiction were clearly shown; and where the author-
ity of the court of first instance to issue an order ancillary
to the main suit depended upon a statute, the scope and ap-
plicability of which were subject to substantial doubt. The
District Court on November 29 affirmatively decided that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was of no force in this case and
that injunctive relief was therefore authorized. Orders
outstanding or issued after that date were to be obeyed
until they expired or were set aside by appropriate pro-
ceedings, appellate or otherwise. Convictions for criminal
contempt intervening before that time may stand .... 9
Perhaps the approach in United States v. United Mine Workers
of America may be utilized in drafting a statute to eliminate con-
flicting proceedings in removal cases. Such a statute might provide
that even though the federal courts ultimately decide that removal
was improvidently granted, and accordingly remand the case, any
proceedings taken in the state court while the federal court was
asserting jurisdiction, and in conflict with the federal court's as-
serted jurisdiction, shall be void. It is interesting to note that the
Texas courts have already taken such a position. In Bishop-Babcock
Sales Co. v. Lackman, the court of civil appeals held:
After the suit was removed to the federal court and
93 Significant cases in this development are: Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165 (1938); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371 (1940); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). See also Boskey
and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 COL. L. REv. 1006
(1940); Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of
Jurisdictional Issues, 36 Gso. L. J. 154 (1948).
94330 U.S. 258 (1947).
95 Id. at 293-294.
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during its pending in that court, the state court had no
jurisdiction of it and the defendant was not required to file
an answer in that court even to the merits of the case.98
A limitation was indicated in Grote v. Price:
... if from the face of the record the case is clearly
not removable, then the state court does not lose its juris-
diction while the case is pending in the federal courts.
9 7
Although it is manifestly impossible to eliminate all conflicts
between state and federal courts in removal cases, it is certainly
desirable to reduce them so far as possible. It would seem that the
foregoing approach offers some possibility of achieving this ob-
jective.
CONCLUSION
The removal chapter of H.R. 3214 will effect a much-needed
clarification of this difficult subject. The orderly re-arrangement
of the chapter is a substantial improvement. The provision for fil-
ing the removal petition in the federal court is particularly desir-
able. However, the revision of the separable controversy provision
is of doubtful benefit, and could easily prove to be a serious source
of confusion. The provisions for removal procedure should be clari-
fied and made explicit. H.R. 3214 does not attempt to deal with
the problem of conflicts between federal and state courts in re-
moval cases. Such an attempt could be made the subject of separate
legislation.
ADDENDUM
After this article was in page proof, H. R. 3214, with amend-
ments, was passed by the Senate on June 12, 1948, and the Senate
amendments were agreed to by the House of Representatives on
June 16, 1948.
0 4 S.W. 2d 109, 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
97 139 Tex. 472, 476, 163 S.W. 2d 1059, 1060 (1942).
1948]
